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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PAM RILEY,

:
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.
Case No. 970115
LES INABNIT, dba UINTAH AUTO SALES,
CAREFREE HOMES,
Defendant/Appellee.

:

Priority No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure (1992) and Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2, whereby an appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court may be taken from any order, decree or judgment of the District Court, subject tp
i
assignment to the Utah Court of Appeals. Said assignment to the Utah Court of Appeals by the
Utah Supreme Court has occurred. This is an appeal from a final order rendered by the
Honorable John R. Anderson in the Eighth District Court in and for Uintah County, State of
Utah filed on February 29,1997.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal are whether a district court judge may, as a matter of law,
make a ruling based on facts never introduced as evidence in the trial and award or refuse to
award damages based on such facts not in evidence and can a trial court exceed the jurisdiction
over the subject matter granted to the court by the pleadings filed in a case by granting relief not
requested by the pleadings.

1

STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Appellate review is based on a standard of correction of error. Questions regarding the
jurisdiction of the court to hear a matter in controversy before it is a conclusion of law.
Conclusions of law are reviewed under the nondeferential standard of correction of error. See
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)(standard of review for trial court determinations of law
characterized as "correctness). Further, while judicial notice is a fact-based question, it would
still be reviewed under a correction of error standard in that it is an application of law (that
being the rule of judicial notice) applied to the facts of the case. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 ("the
effect of a given set of facts is a question of law and, therefore, one on which an appellate court
owes no deference to a trial court's determination.").
Further the trial court's determination as the application of the Uniform Commercial
Code to the contract for sale should be reviewed under a correctness standard since it is an
application of law to the facts of the case and thus is not afforded any discretion. Pena. 869 P.2d
at 936 (third category of questions being "application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the
determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law").
In contrast, the trial court's decisions that Defendant had acted negligently in damaging
the trees on Plaintiff's property while attempting to deliver the mobile home, but failing to
award damages for such negligence should be reviewed under the deferential standard of
correction of error since the determination of damages is a factual question. Pena. 869 P.2d at
935-36 ("findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous
standard").
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PERTINENT STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS
Pertinent rule provisions include Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, dealing with
judicial notice of adjudicative facts, Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 12 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pertinent statutory provisions include Utah Code Annotated
§§70A-2-101 et seq. (1965 as amended), otherwise known as the Uniform Commercial Code.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Plaintiffs Complaint was filed in the Eighth District Court in and for Uintah

County on April 4,1996 and an Amended Complaint was filed April 22,1996. Said complaint
was for Breach of Contract/Recission in that the mobile home was delivered to Plaintiffs
property damaged, for Violation of the Uniform Commercial Code in that Defendant breached
his duty under the Code to perform the contract in a workmanlike and satisfactory manner, for
Negligence in that Defendant negligently installed the mobile home and damaged both the home
and the property in so doing, and for Breach of Bond Warranty for auto dealers. The cause of
action for breach of the bond warranty was dropped at trial since a mobile home is not classified
as a motor vehicle under the bond requirements. The relief requested was for recission or
cancellation of the contract and a refund of the monies paid under the contract, for Defendant to
move the damaged home from the property at his own expense, and for damages for the
destruction of the property due to Defendant's negligence.
2.

The Amended Complaint was served on Defendant and an Answer and

Counterclaim was filed on May 3,1996. Said Counterclaim was for default under the contract
in failing to make payments under the contract and requested relief in the form of repossession
of the mobile home with the proceedsfromthe resale of it to be applied to the balance owed
3

with interest, costs, attorney's fees and the costs of sale.
3.

The Answer to the Counterclaim was filed on May 22, 1996.

4.

Trial was held on the matter on January 10, 1997, the Honorable John R.

Anderson presiding.
5.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was filed on January 30, 1997.

6.

The Order and Judgment was filed on January 30,1997.

7.

The Notice and Entry of Judgment was filed on February 5, 1997.

8.

The Notice of Appeal was filed February 26,1997.

9.

The Notice of Cross Appeal was filed March 11,1997.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

Trial on the case in the Eighth District Court in Uintah County occurred on

January 10,1997, the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding. At the trial, evidence was put on
by both parties as to the sale of a mobile home by Defendants to Plaintiffs and the contract for
the installation of said home on Plaintiff's property by Defendant. See transcript of the trial pgs.
10-13, 51-55. Both parties also put on evidence that the construction of the access to the
property for delivery of the home was to be done by Defendant. See transcript of the trial pgs.
34,36-38,59,75-77.
2.

Plaintiff put on evidence as to the condition of the home both prior to delivery

and on-site after delivery by Defendant and of the damage that was caused by Defendant during
the delivery that was not in existence at the time of Plaintiffs inspection of the mobile home.
See transcript of the trial pgs. 10-12,15,18-25, 27-29, 57-58, 69-74. Defendant admitted to
causing the damage and said that he had been going to fix it until Plaintiff rejected it. See
4

transcript of the trial pgs. 66-69.
3.

Plaintiff put on evidence as to the condition of the property both before and after

the delivery of the mobile home and the construction of the road by Defendant used for the
delivery. Plaintiff further put on evidence of the value of the trees on the property and of the
fact that the importance of the trees was expressed to Defendant prior to his construction of a
road on Plaintiffs property. See transcript of the trial pgs. 39-41,47-48, 80. Defendant
admitted to causing the damage to the trees, but claimed that it was all necessary despite his
previous assurance to Plaintiff that the trees would not be damaged. See transcript of the trial
pgs.47-48,60, 80.
4.

Plaintiff also put on testimony as to the approximate value of the trees and the

costs of replacement of the trees, including labor and time. See transcript of the trial pgs. 111119. The trial court found that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to any damages for the destruction
of their trees. See transcript of the trial pgs. 157.
5.

At the close of Plaintiff s case, Plaintiff asked for attorney's fees to be awarded.

The trial court refused to consider the issue of Plaintiff s attorney's fees since such relief had not
been requested in the pleadings. See transcript of trial pgs. 130.
6.

During closing arguments, Plaintiffs counsel argued the application of the

Uniform Commercial Code to the contract for sale and that the Uniform Commercial Code
allowed for cancellation of the contract and for recovery of the purchase price already paid. See
transcript of the trial pgs. 141-42.
7.

The trial court found that the Defendant had acted negligently in installing the

home, but not in building a road upon Plaintiffs property for which to bring the home onto the
5

property. The trial court also rescinded the contract for sale of the home based on Defendant's
breach of the contract and upon Plaintiffs rejection of the home as damaged goods and awarded
Plaintiff the return of the down payment and monthly payments made to Defendant, including
the interest. See transcript of the trial pgs. 154-55.
8.

The trial court then went further and awarded Defendant monetary compensation

based upon an admittedly arbitrary rental value of the mobile home for the several months that
the mobile home had been on Plaintiffs property, thus reducing the award of damages given to
the Plaintiffs. See transcript of the trial pgs. 156. At no time during the trial was evidence as to
the rental value of the mobile home ever introduced by either party to the matter, nor did
Defendant ever request such relief in a counterclaim to Plaintiffs suit.
ARGUMENT
May a district court judge may, as a matter of law, make a ruling
based on facts never introduced as evidence in the trial and award or
refuse to award damages based on such facts not in evidence.
The American system of justice requires that disputes brought before the court be heard
and tried on their individual merits and this is accomplished by way of the introduction of
evidence regarding the dispute to the trier of fact. Such evidence is put forward by the parties to
the action and the proposed evidence is subject to extensive rules on whether or not it may be
admissible to be brought before the court. The proponent of the evidence must put the proposed
evidence forward and provide the opposing party a chance to review it and to refute it.
There is some evidence which is of such a nature that it is not capable of being disputed
as to its truthfulness. Such evidence is then capable of being judicially noticed without having
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to have its reliability or truthfulness put to the test in order for it to be admissible. This kind of
evidence is the subject matter of Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 201 deals only with adjudicative facts, which are simply the facts of the individual
case. According to the Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 201, subdivision (a), the manner of
their initial introduction is usually through witness testimony offered by one of the parties.
The usual method of establishing adjudicative facts is through the
introduction of evidence, ordinarily consisting of the testimony of witnesses. If
particular facts are outside the area of reasonable controversy, this process is
dispensed with as unnecessary. A high degree of indisputability is the essential
prerequisite
Professor Davis, quoted in the Advisory Committee's Note, stated that:
"The reason we use trial-type procedure, I think, is that we make the
practical judgment, on the basis of experience, that taking evidence, subject to
cross-examination and rebuttal, is the best way to resolve controversies involving
disputes of adjudicative facts, that is, facts pertaining to the parties. The reason
we require a determination on the record is that we think fair procedure in
resolving disputes of adjudicative facts calls for giving each party a chance to
meet in the appropriate fashion the facts that come to the tribunal's attention, and
the appropriate fashion for meeting disputed adjudicative facts includes rebuttal
evidence, cross-examination, usually confrontation, and argument (either written
or oral or both. The key to a fair trial is opportunity to use the appropriate
weapons (rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument) to meet adverse
materials that come to the tribunal's attention." A System ofJudicial Notice
Based on Fairness and Convenience, in Perspectives ofLaw 69, 93 (1964).

As pointed out in the Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 201, the most important
element of evidence capable of judicial notice is that it be well nigh indisputable, not capable of
any reasonable disagreement. Subdivision (b) further states that judicial notice of facts is limited
to those facts "so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute [or
those] so generally known or of such common notoriety within the territorial jurisdiction of the
7

court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute" and those facts "capable of
immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable
accuracy." Id
In this case, the fact the trial court took judicial notice of was a rental value on the
mobile home that was on Plaintiffs property and in a damaged condition. Evidence relating to
this fact was not introduced by either party, either in the pleadings or during the trial, nor was
their an opportunity to rebut, cross-examine or argue about the evidence since the trial court did
not even mention the possibility of including such a detail until the court's final ruling on the
matter. This ruling diminished the damages that the Plaintiff was awarded for the Defendant's
breach of contract, thus affecting a substantial right of the Plaintiff to be able to recover for such
breach.
In State ex rel. v. Yates. 765 P.2d 251 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), the juvenile court, in
terminating Mr. Yates parentalrights,took judicial notice of a post-hearing criminal conviction
in its findings that his parental rights should be terminated. Even though such evidence was of
the nature of those facts that can be judicially noticed, the juvenile court was found to have erred
in taking judicial notice without giving notice to the parties. The Supreme Court said that in that
case, the judgment would stand if there was other properly admitted evidence to establish those
same facts, which was found in his being charged with a criminal act and anticipating future
incarceration. The Supreme Court said that the important point was whether the error was
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, i.e., "without the error there was ca reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.'" Yates. 765 P.2d at 254; State v. Knight.
734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)(quoting State v. Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042,1048 (Utah 1984)). In
8

this case, it is clear that without the court's error in taking judicial notice of the potential rental
value of the mobile home that the outcome would have been more favorable to Plaintiff
Can a trial court exceed the jurisdiction over the subject
matter granted to the court by the pleadings filed in a case by
granting relief not requested by the pleadings.
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the general rules of pleadings and
the initiation of a case. It states that "a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,... shall
contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of
jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Rule 12 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the rules regarding defenses, stating that "[e]very
defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,... shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except... (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process,
(5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19."
A trial court is granted jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case or controversy when
the required pleadings are filed with the court. The jurisdiction of the court is therefore limited
to the matter contained within the pleadings and the relief that the court may grant to the parties
before it is limited as well to that requested by the parties. A court may not exceed its
jurisdiction to decide any matters not specifically placed before it. If this were not the case, the
courts could, on their own volition, reach out into the community at large and begin deciding any
9

and all issues that the court feels inclined to decide.
In the case of In re Estate of Powell. 626 P.2d 430 (Utah 1981), the court was faced with
a lawsuit where one of the daughters of the deceased was seeking to recover from a daughter-inlaw of the deceased two certificates of deposit the daughter-in-law claimed were hers under the
decedent's will. None of the pleadings related to the validity of the will or of the probate
proceedings and certain parties with an interest in the estate were not made parties to the
probate. The trial court ruled that the will was executed in error and was not the last will and
testament of the decedent and therefore set aside the will, declaring it null and void, and
instructed the administrator to proceed with an intestate probate. The Supreme Court found that
since the validity of the will had not even been suggested in the pleadings before the trial court
judge, the trial court had no jurisdiction to rule upon the matter, saying:
This court has ruled many times that this court can vacate an order,
judgment or decree entered in the trial court when that court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the same. We here determine that the ruling made in the proceedings in
case 7416 that the will was void was beyond the jurisdiction of that court, both
because of the provisions of Section 75-3-12, cited supra [dealing with
procedures for revoking a probate], and because the pleadings then before the
court were totally void ofany such issue and parties seriously affected by such
ruling were not before the court. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 436.
In Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter. Inc.. 930 P.2d268 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996),
the court discussed the pleading rules and said that the "fundamental purpose of the liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute' subject only to the requirement that their adversaries have
'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
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litigation involved.'" 14 at 275 (quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971
(Utah 1982)). Also, in Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Co.. 57 F.3d 1168 (1st Cir. 1995), the trial
court's decision was overturned in that the trial court had "recast the complaint and granted
relief on a theory which was not pled and not tried." Id at 1174 (quoted in Consolidated Realty
Group, 930 P.2d at 275).
In this case, the trial court granted relief to the Defendant in the form of an offset to the
damages awarded to the Plaintiff for Defendant's breach of contract based on what the court, on
its own, determined would be the rental value of the mobile home on the Plaintiffs property in a
damaged condition. Such relief was not requested by the Defendant's, either in the answer or
the counterclaim, nor was such a request even brought up during the course of the trial. The trial
court was aware that its jurisdiction is limited by the pleadings, as evidenced by the refusal to
hear evidence regarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees since they were not requested in the pleadings.
The relief was granted on the court's own volition, thus knowingly exceeding the jurisdiction of
the court over the controversy.
Is it reversible error for a trial court to fail to award damages
in the form of a refund of all monies paid by a buyer under a
contract for sale for a cancellation of the contract for sale due
to seller's breach of the contract, as allowed by the Uniform
Commercial Code, Utah Code Annotated §70A-2-711.
The Uniform Commercial Code dealing with the sale of goods, found in Utah Code
Annotated §§70A-2-101 et. seq., provides for contracts for the sale of goods, defined as "all
things which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities, and things in action." U.C.A.
§70A-2-105(1). This covers everything capable of being moved with the few exemptions
11

specified. A mobile home that at the time it is contracted to be sold is movable would therefore
be included in this definition. The mobile home that is the subject matter of the contract in
question under this case was definitely movable, as shown by the fact that it was moved and
placed on Plaintiffs property. Further, it was a part of the contract itself that the home be
movedfromDefendant's lot to Plaintiffs property. Therefore, the other provisions of the
U.C.C. also apply to this transaction, including the provisions for rejection of goods that do not
conform to the contract, U.C.A. §70A-2-601, and the cancellation of the contract based upon
said rejection, U.C.A. §70A-2-711.
Section 70A-2-711 sets forth a buyer's remedies upon rightful rejection of
nonconforming goods, saying that a "buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in
addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid (a) "cover" and have damages under
the next section as to all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the
contract [Section 70A-2-712]; or (b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter
(Section 70A-2-713)." Id Not only is the buyer entitled to cancel the contract and recover the
monies already paid under the contract for the purchase of the goods, but also to recover
damages either for having to "cover" (obtain replacement goods) or for seller's nondelivery,
which damages are calculated according to the sections specified. According to the plain
language of the statute, buyer is entitled to a refund of the full purchase price paid under the
contract. The additional damages may indeed by offset by the fair market price of the goods, as
is specified in the sections listed in Section 70A-2-711, but even then, there must exist some
evidence as to the fair market price, which is defined in Section 70A-2-723.
In this case, the trial court granted the recission of the contract, but failed to award the
12
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steps without consulting Plaintiffs or ever mentioning to them that the trees would peed to be
CUUrtl Or
.L£
removed.
Plaintiff put on evidence as to the value of the trees and the cost of replacing the trees,
including labor and time. See transcript of the trial pgs. 111-118. The trees had been on the
property for decades and it would take many, many years to get new trees to grow. To transplant
fully grown trees would be expensive and time-consuming, even assuming that the right kind of
trees could be obtained. It was apparent from the evidence of the destruction that no care was
taken by Defendant in removing those trees he considered necessary, nor did he ever discuss the
possibility of needing to remove any trees with Plaintiffs prior to removal. The evidence of
Defendant's negligence was clear and apparent, yet the trial court did not find Defendant liable
for the damage he caused to the trees on Plaintiffs' property. This constitutes error on the part of
the trial court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In summary, judicial notice cannot be taken of any evidentiary fact unless it be
indisputable in nature, which was not the case with thefindingof the trial court as to the rental
value of the mobile home. Further, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief in
the form of an offset to the damages awarded to Plaintiff of the arbritrarily assigned rental value
of the mobile home in that such relief was not requested in the pleadings. Also, the trial court
erred in not allowing the full refund of all monies paid to Defendant under the contract allowed
under the U.C.C. for rightful rejection of goods by Plaintiff. The trial court also erred in not
finding the Defendant liable for the damages caused by Defendant to Plaintiffs property,
meaning the obviously negligent damage done to the trees.
14

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and on the pleadingsfiledherein, Appellant
respectfully requests that the trial court's order be vacated and remanded for a ruling in
conformity with the trial court's jurisdiction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ , day ofSji^^T

, 1997.

Cindy Baifam/Coombs
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this

day of

, 1997,1 mailed two (2) true and accurate

copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by United States mail, postage prepaid, to:

CLARK ALLRED
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
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APPENDIX
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to
each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If
he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment,
he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of
an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the
preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or
paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments,
he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute
of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a
proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately
or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has
regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days after the
service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by
statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim against him
shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall
serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or,
if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows,
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the
merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack ofjurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial
any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered
(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of
as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision
(b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment
mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on
application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be
deferred until the trial.
|
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required toframea
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responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before interposing his
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after
notice of the order or within such other time as the court mayfix,the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if
no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty
days after the service of the pleading upon him, the court may order stricken from any pleading
any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join
with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to him. If a party makes a
motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available to
him which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based
on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or
reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears
by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed
of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(I) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides
out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the
plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff.
Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall
order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment
of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as
ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant,
enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1,1990.)
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court
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or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and
supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to
be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the
absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the
jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-105. Definitions - Transferability - "Goods" "Future" goods - "Lot" - "Commercial unit."
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes
the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty
(Section 70A-2-107).
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass.
Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A purported present sale of
future goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods.
(4) An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods is sufficiently identified
to be sold although the quantity of the bulk is not determined. Any agreed proportion of such a
bulk or any quantity thereof agreed upon by number, weight or other measure may to the extent
of the seller's interest in the bulk be sold to the buyer who then becomes an owner in common.
(5) "Lot" means a parcel or a single article which is the subject matter of a separate sale
or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the contract.
(6) "Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single
whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its character or value on the
market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a machine) or a set of articles (as
a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any
other unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a single whole.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-105.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-106. Definitions - "Contract" - "Agreement" "Contract for sale" - "Sale" - "Present sale" - "Conforming" to contract - "Termination" "Cancellation."
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and "agreement" are
limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes both a
present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the
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passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present sale"
means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract.
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are "conforming" or conform
to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract.
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or
law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On "termination" all obligations
which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach or
performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the
other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that the canceling party also
retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-106.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise,
description, sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty,
but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the
seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-313.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-314. Implied warranty - Merchantability - Usage of
trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
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(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 70A-2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-314.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties Livestock.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence
(Section 70A-2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable.
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language which in common understanding calls
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty; and
b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample
or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him;
and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course
of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy
(Sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719).
(5) If a contract for the sale of livestock, which may include cattle, hogs, sheep, and
horses, does not contain a written statement as to warranty of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose, there shall be no implied warranty that the livestock are free from disease
and sickness at the time of the sale and the seller shall not be liable for damages arising from the
lack of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-316; 1981, ch. 276, § 1.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-601. Buyerfs rights on improper delivery.
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on breach in installment contracts (Section
70A-2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy
(Sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719), if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract, the buyer may
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(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-601.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-711. Buyer's remedies in general - Buyer's security
interest in rejected goods.
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or
justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the
whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and
whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been
paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected whether
or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-713).
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this chapter (Section
70A-2-502); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as provided in this
chapter (Section 70A-2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security
interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price and any
expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and
may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 70A-2-706).
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-711.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-712. "Cover" - Buyer's procurement of substitute
goods.
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by making in good
faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods
in substitution for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recoverfromthe seller as damages the difference between the cost of
cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter
defined (Section 70A-2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from any
other remedy.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-712.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-713. Buyer's damages for nondelivery or repudiation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of market price
(Section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this chapter
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(Section 70A-2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection
after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-713.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED§ 70A-2-723. Proof of market price - Time and place.
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before the time for
performance with respect to some or all of the goods, any damages based on market price
(Section 70A-2-708 or Section 70A-2-713) shall be determined according to the price of such
goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation.
(2) If evidence of a price prevailing at the times or places described in this chapter is not
readily available the price prevailing within any reasonable time before or after the time
described or at any other place which in commercial judgment or under usage of trade would
serve as a reasonable substitute for the one described may be used, making any proper allowance
for the cost of transporting the goods to or from such other place.
(3) Evidence of a relevant price prevailing at a time or place other than the one
described in this chapter offered by one party is not admissible unless and until he has given the
other party such notice as the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-723.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §70A-2-724. Admissibility of market quotations
Whenever the prevailing price or value of any goods regularly bought and sold in any
established commodity market is in issue, reports in official publications or trade journals or in
newspapers or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports of such market shall be
admissible in evidence. The circumstances of the preparation of such a report may be shown to
affect its weight but not its admissibility.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-724.
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